This paper experimentally examines how information affects behavior in a threshold public goods game. Three treatments investigate how subjects react to varying amounts of information about the contribution behavior of other group members. Results suggest that revealing anonymous information about others' contributions leads to a significant decrease in contributions and an increase in the variance of contributions. In contrast, when individual contributions are identified by subject number, average contributions increase and the variance of contributions decreases significantly.
I. INTRODUCTION
In economics, pure public goods are defined as goods that are``nonrival'' and`n onexcludable.'' Nonrivalry can be thought of as the jointly consumable nature of a good, where consumption by one individual does not diminish the consumption possibilities of other individuals.
1 Nonexcludability implies that once the public good is provided, it is impossible (or prohibitively costly) to specifically prevent some individuals from enjoying its benefits.
Recent fiscal stress has generated an interest among public officials in alternative institutional arrangements for the delivery of public goods. Within the current political climate, options which circumvent the``T-word,'' taxes, are particularly attractive. Voluntary contribution institutions offer this feature, and thus represent a potentially viable option to supplement the tax-financed, majority voting collective choice mechanism for providing public goods. Perhaps fueled by the public policy interest in nontax, decentralized methods of finance, the Public Finance literature in economics reflects a rekindled theoretical interest in voluntary contribution models for providing public goods.
A member of the class of voluntary contributions mechanisms, the provision point mechanism (PPM), is studied in this paper. In the PPM, a specific project and cost requirement are predetermined. Individuals impacted by the project submit bids stating their commitment to covering the project's costs. If the contributions meet or exceed the threshold, the public good is provided; otherwise the project is not provided.
3
One real world example of the PPM is the innovative Green Choice program proposed by the Niagara Mohawk Power Company of New York. The program is a voluntary partnership between Niagara Mohawk and local citizens who are concerned about reducing air pollution in their communities. Consumers can opt to join the Green Choice program by committing to contribute an amount each month above and beyond their electric bills. Funds will be collected for a twelve-month period and, if sufficient, will then be used to build an environmentally friendly energy project and to plant trees. 4 Because the provision of the energy project is``all or nothing,'' the Green Choice program is essentially a Provision Point process; if subscriptions fall short of the necessary level, the program will be abandoned and the funds will be returned to the contributors.
5
The PPM has a set of efficient Nash equilibria (which will be characterized more formally in Section III below). Roughly, an efficient Nash equilibria is comprised of any vector of individual contributions that (1) exactly sums to the contribution threshold and (2) does not involve any individual contributing an amount larger than his benefits from the public good. Since there are generally many combinations of individual contributions that could meet these conditions, the set of efficient Nash equilibria can be very large and within this set, no equilibrium is better for all players than any other (the equilibria are not pareto-rankable).
While the PPM has the ability to privately provide public goods. The decision group must agree not only to provide the project, but participants must agree on how to divide the cost of the project. In the PPM, the task is one of coordination
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3 The PPM can include features to handle the refund of collected funds when the threshold is not reached, or the rebate of funds collected in excess of the threshold. The first issue is explored experimentally and theoretically in Isaac, Schmidtz and Walker (1989) and the second in Marks and Croson (forthcoming) . 4 For a complete discussion of the Green Choice program; see Schultze (1995) . 5 As illustrated by the Green Choice program, the PPM is especially applicable when projects involve a degree of technological lumpiness (for example, one half of a bridge or power plant is not useful), or in situations where decision makers are committed, for some reason, to a project of a particular scale. In these situations, a predetermined project size and an``all or nothing'' provision is appropriate.
on one of the efficient equilibrium allocations. Do groups in the PPM successfully select and coordinate on one of the many sets of successful contributions? Or does the group's inability to coordinate result in nonprovision? Furthermore, are there institutional features of the PPM that can be exploited to make provision more likely? These questions suggest a role for experimentation. The experiment detailed in this paper makes two main contributions to our knowledge of the PPM. First, it provides additional evidence of the usefulness of the PPM for public goods provision in certain settings. Second, we investigate a potentially important institutional detail of the PPM: the extent of information about individual contribution behavior provided to the participants. This experiment involves three treatments where the degree of knowledge about individual contribution behavior is manipulated.
In the Group Only treatment, participants are informed only of aggregate statistics (total group contributions) and are not informed about individual behavior in any way. With this limited information, a participant can determine what percentage of the aggregate contributions he provided, but has no information about the behavior of the remaining group members. The Individual Anonymous treatment is designed to isolate the effect of revealing information without identification of subjects. The information about individual contributions released in this treatment can communicate equitable or inequitable behavior in contributing. However, that behavior cannot be identified with any particular individual. In the Individual Identifiable treatment, contributions are revealed according to a commonly known subject number. By revealing contributions such that an individual's behavior is identifiable and can be followed throughout the experiment, the ability to form and maintain a reputation for``doing one's share'' toward providing the public good is created. In this treatment, subjects have both information about individual contributions and the ability to identify who contributed what.
This investigation sheds light on two questions. First, what is the effect of information about (equitable or inequitable) cost sharing in the public goods processes? A comparison between the Group Only and Individual Anonymous treatments will be used to answer this question (Section V). Second, does the addition of identifiability encourage individual contributions and therefore act to limit individual free-riding? A comparison between the Individual Anonymous and Individual Identifiable treatments will be used to answer this question (Section VI).
II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Previous literature in this area comes from a number of different sources and is motivated by many different social and economic problems. In this section we characterize a number of different types of public goods problems and mention previous experiments which have manipulated information in each setting.
Continuous public goods have the characteristic that as more is contributed, the amount of public good available increases. In contrast, discrete public goods are allor-nothing. If a threshold of contributions is reached, a fixed amount of public good is provided; otherwise it is not.
6 Continuous contributions have the characteristic that each decision maker can choose his level of contribution from a continuum. In contrast, with discrete contributions an individual either contributes or he does not; the decision is 0 or 1.
Although there are hybrids, much of the previous research can be classified in this way. Figure 1 presents the assignment of various literatures in this area to the categories outlined.
A. Continuous Public GoodsÂDiscrete Contributions
Dawes (1980) reviews a number of experiments in this area. Three studies compare rates of cooperation under public disclosure of individual choices versus under anonymity. In a classic paper, Bixenstine, Levitt, and Wilson (1966) , subjects play a six-person social dilemma game repeatedly. The authors find significantly higher levels of cooperation when players are identified than when they make decisions anonymously, after (but not before) a conversational break. A similar result is found by Jerdee and Rosen (1974) . In a slightly more recent article, Fox and Guyer (1978) have subjects play 30 repetitions of a four-player social dilemma game. The authors report significantly more cooperation in groups where decisions are public than in groups where decisions are anonymous, independent of the existence of discussion.
B. Continuous Public GoodsÂContinuous Contributions
1. Volutionary contribution mechanism. The VCM is a continuous version of the prisoner's dilemma game. Reviews of VCM experiments can be found in Ledyard (1995) and Davis and Holt (1993, Chap. 6) . The most relevant of the VCM experiments to this study compare allocation levels under different informational conditions. Sell
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and Wilson (1991) use four-person groups in a 10-round VCM. Over all 10 rounds, no significant difference in contribution level is found between groups who are told individual contributions and those who are told only group contributions. However, in the last five rounds, contributions are significantly higher under individual information than under total information. Similarly, Weimann (1994) compares contributions of subjects in playing a five-player, 10-round VCM with different levels of information. Using all the periods, no significant difference is found between the mean behavior of subjects. In an attempt to reconcile these two results, Croson (forthcoming) examines four-person groups playing two 10-round VCMs. In the group treatment, subjects are told the total contributions of the rest of their group. In the individual treatment, subjects are told each individual's contribution. Results suggest that while mean contributions are not affected by this additional information, the variance of contributions is significantly higher in the latter treatment than the former. This increased variance could explain the differing results of the two previous studies.
2. Social loafing. In social loafing experiments, subjects are asked to produce some output, either individually or in a group, but are typically not compensated as a function of their effort. The most relevant social loafing experiments to this study demonstrate that when individual outputs are identifiable and outputs or effort levels can be compared, the loafing effect is eliminated. Williams, Harkins, and Latane (1981) , show that subjects produce less noise when shouting together than when shouting alone; however, when subjects in another treatment are hooked up with individual microphones but shout together, they produce as much noise as subjects who shout alone. In a follow-up study, Harkins and Jackson (1985) ask subjects to think of as many uses for a particular object as they can. As before, the group of subjects whose outputs are identifiable think of as many uses for the object as the group who think alone, while the set of subjects whose ideas are pooled, think of significantly fewer.
C. Discrete Public GoodsÂDiscrete Contributions
Van de Kragt et al., (1983) first investigate provision in a discrete public good game, where individual contributions are all-or-nothing. In their canonical experiment, subjects are given a voucher worth 85 and organized into groups of seven. If three subjects out of the seven (in another treatment, five subjects out of the seven) choose to contribute their voucher to the group, every group member receives a bonus of 810. Later studies include Dawes et al. (1986) and Rapoport and Eshed-Levy (1989) who examine the impact of greed versus fear in these games. We know of no previous experiment in this area which addresses the impact of individual or identifiable information on play.
D. Discrete Public GoodsÂContinuous Contributions
Our paper investigates provision in a discrete public good game where individual contributions are continuous. Previous papers with this same structure are Isaac, Schmidtz and Walker (1989) and Bagnoli and McKee (1991) . Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker (1989) modify the Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984) VCM framework by adding a provision point. Subjects are organized into groups of four and the game is run both with and without returning contributions when the provision point is not met. The public good is provided in 25 0 of the rounds (pooled over levels of provision points), although subjects are given information only about group decisions. Bagnoli and McKee (1991) run a somewhat different version of the PPM game. In their experiments, the public good is provided in 86.7 0 of the rounds (pooled over homogeneous and heterogeneous valuations and endowments).
8 In their experiment as in Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker (1989) , no information about individual contributions is revealed.
9 We know of no previous experiment in this area which addresses the impact of individual or identifiable information on play.
E. Summary
Although there has been active research in the area of public goods provision and social dilemmas, very little research has been done on the effect of individual andÂor identifiable information (and none in the area of discrete public goods). What we do know comes from the continuous public goods literature. In social dilemma games (continuous public goods, discrete contributions) individual and identifiable information leads to higher cooperation rates than individual but anonymous information, in the presence of communication (Bixenstine, Levitt, 6 Wilson, 1966; Jerdee 6 Rosen, 1974) and even in its absence (Fox 6 Guyer, 1978) . In the VCM (continuous public good, continuous contribution), individual but anonymous information has no effect on subjects' average contributions (Sell 6 Wilson, 1991; Weiman, 1994; Croson, forthcoming) but significantly increases the variance of contributions (Croson, forthcoming) . In social loafing experiments, identifiability significantly increases effort over individual anonymous information (Williams, Harkins, 6 Latane , 1981; Harkins 6 Jackson, 1985) . To our knowledge, this is the first paper which examines identifiability in the context of discrete public goods. However, a number of our hypotheses, described in Section IV, are drawn from this previous literature.
III. THE GAME AND ITS EQUILIBRIA

A. The Model
Imagine that N individuals are concerned with providing a public good to their community. Each individual has an endowment, E i , consisting of a level of the private good, X. Individuals can choose to contribute any part of the private good endowment towards provision of a public good, G. The public good is provided in a threshold fashion with a cost of K; if at least K units of the private good are contributed, then the public good G is provided in quantity one, otherwise it is not provided at all. Contributions in excess of K are not returned, although if fewer than K units of the private good are contributed (and the provision-point is not reached) unused contributions are returned to their contributors.
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Each individual, i, has a utility function U i (G, X i ). By specifying the utility function in this way, it is assumed that individuals do not receive utility directly from making a contribution themselves (i.e., there are no warm feelings from being charitable as in Andreoni, 1990) . Rather, individuals care only about the total (public and private) provision level. The utility function is further assumed to be of the linear form
where v i is individual i 's value for the public good, G.
In the provision point mechanism, each individual is asked to anonymously submit a message stating his or her contribution (consisting of some level of private good), _ i , towards the provision of the public good. In this case, _ i =E i &X i , where X i is the amount of the private good individual i chooses to retain for consumption. Each player first chooses _ i , then the public good is produced only if 7 i _ i K. Otherwise contributions _ i are returned to the players and the public good is not provided. Individuals finally receive their utility from the public good (if provided) and from private consumption.
B. Equilibria of the Game
With any parameter values consistent with the public goods problem under discussion, 11 and with common knowledge of K and each v i , in this game there exists a continuum of efficient Nash equilibria in which the players collectively contribute exactly enough to achieve the provision point and provide the public good. These
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10 The first condition corresponds to the No Rebate treatment of Marks and Croson (forthcoming) . The second corresponds to the Refund treatment of Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker (1989) and the Money-Back Guarantee of Dawes et al. (1986) . The rebate and refund condition was chosen for their simplicity and comparability to previous experiments.
11 For example, for there to be a public good, the value to the entire community of the provision of the good must be larger than the cost. Thus we need 7v i K. Similarly, each individual must have enough of an endowment so as to make his contribution feasible. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition is E i v i \i.
equilibria have the same group contribution level; they are distinct from one another only in the cost-sharing rule used to divide the contributions toward the public good among the participants. These equilibria consist of all possible vectors of allocations such that:
(1) 7 i _ i =K (the public good is exactly provided) (2) _ i v i \i (no individual contributes more to the public good than his individual value).
In addition, there is a continuum of inefficient equilibria of this stage game. An inefficient equilibrium outcome is such that the provision point is not met, the public good is not provided, and no single participant can rationally increase his contribution to reach the threshold.
C. The Experimental Game 1. Experimental design and parameters. The experimental game which implements this model involves five players, each of whom receives 55 tokens (E i ) which they can allocate to a GROUP or to a PRIVATE account. The PRIVATE account models individual and personal consumption of resources. Each token allocated to the PRIVATE account earns 1/ for its contributor. The GROUP account models voluntary contribution to the public good. If at least 125 (K) tokens are allocated to the GROUP account each player receives an additional bonus payment (v i =50/) regardless of their allocation decision.
12 Tokens above 125 contributed to the GROUP account are not returned. If fewer than 125 are allocated to the GROUP account, all tokens submitted to the GROUP account are returned to their contributors and are retroactively invested in their contributor's PRIVATE account at 1/ per token. All of the parameter values are were publically announced and thus commonly known to all participants.
Each group of five subjects plays the game 25 times with the same partners. Once an individual commits to a contribution, he is not given the opportunity to reevaluate and resubmit a different contribution before the outcome of the round is announced.
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Notice that the players in this game are all symmetric. Later we will refer to the equality of contributions (and thus payoffs when the public good is provided) as being an equitable outcome. Clearly, this assumption relies on the symmetry of the game.
2. Equilibria. As mentioned above, the set of efficient equilibria of the stage game involve each group of five subjects collectively allocating exactly 125 tokens to the GROUP account. Additionally, this stage game has a unique symmetric efficient equilibrium in which each of the five members of the group allocates 25 tokens to the GROUP account. The stage game also has a continuum of inefficient Nash equilibria in which the public good is not provided.
In the inefficient equilibria, somewhere between 0 and 92 tokens are allocated to the group account, but no player unilaterally wants to supplement the account to achieve the provision point. Thus all tokens are returned to the players who are then indifferent between any unsuccessful allocation.
14 Only twelve instances of this inefficient equilibrium were observed out of the 325 group decisions.
15 As a result, our subsequent analysis will focus on the efficient equilibrium outcomes reached by the groups.
Notice that the efficient and inefficient equilibria are characterized for one-shot stage games on which the experiment was based. In fact, subjects played each stage game repeatedly (25 times) with the same group. The finite repetition of a stage game with multiple equilibria has multiple equilibria itself which are not characterized here.
3. Experimental implementation. Experimental instructions were written so that they conform to language developed in the classic public goods paper, Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984) . All language referring to``investments'' or``contributions'' was intentionally removed and replaced by words such as``allocation'' of tokens. Common information was established by reading instructions out loud and using an overhead projector to display results. Subjects were asked to complete a quiz in order to ensure that everyone understood how to calculate their earnings and a session did not begin until everyone had correctly completed the quiz.
All sessions in this experiment involved subjects recruited from undergraduate classes at Longwood College. Each session involved one group of five subjects. By having only one group in a room, individuals could identify who was in their group, but they were not allowed to communicate in any way.
16 Subjects were paid their earnings in this experiment privately and in cash at the end of the session. The average length of the session was 2 hours and average earnings of the participants were around 817.
4. Implementation of treatments. In all three treatments, subjects were seated at desks with subject numbers prominently displayed on them. In the Group Only treatment, individual allocations to the GROUP account were not revealed in any way and subjects were only informed of the aggregate allocation to the public good. At the end of a period in the Group Only treatment, the Fig. 2 overhead was completed and displayed.
In the Individual Anonymous treatment, individuals were informed of the aggregate group allocation level as well as the vector of individual allocations to the GROUP
IDENTIFYING INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS
14 An example of these equilibria is a vector of allocations to the group account like (19, 19, 18, 18, 18) . Here 92 tokens have been allocated, but since the value of the public good to each player is only 50, no one wants to contribute an additional 33 tokens to unilaterally supplement the group account to achieve 125. No equilibrium of this sort exists in which 94 124 tokens are contributed (when 93 tokens are contributed some players are indifferent between supplementing and not).
15 Interestingly, 11 of these 12 instances occurred in the Individual Anonymous treatment. 16 Experiments were run by three individuals. One was responsible for monitoring the subjects to prevent communication verbal or nonverbal. Students were warned that actions such as talking aloud, sighing, and looking at others would result in their dismissal from the experiment. account. However, individual allocations were posted anonymously in random order so that no particular subject's allocation could be determined. To make this clear to subjects, individual allocations were copied onto small slips of paper which were put into a box and were then drawn out randomly and posted in this order.
At the end of a period in the Individual Anonymous treatment, information was revealed on an overhead as shown in Fig. 3 . In the Individual Identifiable treatment, individual allocations to the GROUP account were posted according to (commonly known) subject number. At the end of a period in this treatment, information was revealed on an overhead as shown in Fig. 4 .
In each of the three treatments, group sizes of five were used and five replications of each treatment were performed. Sessions differed only in the information revealed concerning individual allocations to the GROUP account. 
IV. HYPOTHESES
In this section we present a number of different hypotheses about play in the PPM game under our three treatments. Some come from game-theoretic predictions of Nash equilibrium play, some from previous experimental results in other contexts, and some from our own intuition. The first subsection presents hypotheses which address all three treatments, the second, hypotheses about the effect of anonymous information, and the third, hypotheses about the effect of identifiability.
A. All Three Treatments
One hypothesis we would like to test is the extent to which the Nash equilibrium predictions help to organize the data in this game. Our first hypothesis is simply that groups will coordinate on a Nash equilibrium outcome in all three treatments.
HA 1 : Group contributions will be one of the set of efficient Nash equilibria in each period of this game in all three treatments.
In practice, subjects in experiments rarely hit upon the Nash equilibrium outcome directly. However, we often observe behavior which converges toward the equilibrium prediction. Thus our second hypothesis involves the convergence of group contributions toward the efficient Nash equilibrium amount over time.
HA 2 : Groups contributions will converge toward the efficient Nash equilibrium level of 125 over time in all three treatments.
B. Hypotheses about Anonymous Information: Group Only vs Individual Anonymous
Previous results in the PPM literature suggest that the Nash equilibrium has only limited power to explain outcomes; groups often fail to coordinate. A competing (and perhaps more likely) hypothesis stems from the idea that to play a Nash equilibria involves subjects solving a difficult coordination problem. We suspect that this problem will be easier to solve as the amount of information available grows. Thus we suggest HB 1 : Group contributions will be closer to the efficient Nash equilibrium level of 125 in the Individual Anonymous treatment than in the Group Only treatment.
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In addition, we suspect the additional information available to subjects in the Individual Anonymous treatment will cause them to converge toward the Nash equilibrium level of 125 faster than in the Group Only treatment. This leads to HB 2 : Group contributions will converge toward the efficient Nash equilibrium level of 125 faster in the Individual Anonymous treatment than in the Group Only treatment.
We know that in continuous public goods games, increasing the information about individual decisions available to the subjects often increases the level of cooperation (contribution). If this extends to a threshold public goods setting, then these results suggest HB 3 : Group contributions will be higher in the Individual Anonymous treatment than in the Group Only treatment.
Finally, we suspect that giving subjects information about individual contributions will lead them to focus on the fairness component of the game. The game has a unique symmetric efficient equilibrium in which each of the five members of the group allocates 25 tokens to the GROUP account; this solution might be considered the most``fair'' in that it equalizes everyone's earnings in the experiment. One measure of the fairness of an outcome is the variance of individual contributions. We suspect that under Individual Anonymous information, subjects will be more focused on fairness, and will thus have contributions which are closer together than under Group Only information.
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HB 4 : The variance of individual contributions within each group will be lower in the Individual Anonymous treatment than in the Group Only treatment.
C. Hypotheses about Identifiability: Individual Anonymous vs Individual Identifiable
As in the previous subsection, we suspect that the coordination problem inherent in this game will be easier to solve as the amount of information available grows. Thus we suggest HC 1 : Group contributions will be closer to the efficient Nash equilibrium level of 125 in the Individual Identifiable treatment than in the Individual Anonymous treatment HC 2 : Group contributions will converge toward the efficient Nash equilibrium level of 125 faster in the Individual Identifiable treatment than in the Individual Anonymous treatment.
Previous literature from continuous public goods games suggests that as subjects are given more information, they contribute (cooperate) more. Thus, HC 3 : Group contributions will be higher in the Individual Identifiable treatment than in the Individual Anonymous treatment.
Finally, we again expect that as the level of information available in the experiment increases, subjects will be more concerned about the equity of the distribution of contributions in their group. Thus we predict that the variance of individual contributions within each group will decrease as the level of information increases, suggesting HC 4 : The variance of individual contributions within each group will be lower in the Individual Identifiable treatment than in the Individual Anonymous treatment.
V. RESULTS: THE EFFECT OF ANONYMOUS INFORMATION
Figures 5, 6, and 7 show group contributions for each treatment. Group contributions are clearly clustered around the efficient equilibrium outcome of 125 and seem to converge toward it over the course of the experiment. As in previous experiments, the data depicted in our figures enable us to reject our initial hypothesis (HA 1 ) that groups will routinely play the Nash equilibrium outcome of 125 tokens. Such outcomes were rarely observed.
In this section we discuss the effect of anonymous information by comparing the outcomes of the Group Only and the Individual Anonymous treatments. We find the addition of anonymous individual information hinders coordination in this game, contrary to our initial hypotheses. In Section VI below, we discuss the effect of identifiability by comparing the Individual Anonymous and the Individual Identifiable treatments. We find the addition of identifiability helps coordination in this game, consistent with our hypotheses.
To isolate the effect of information about individual contributions on contribution decisions, we compare the Group Only treatment with the Individual Anonymous treatment. As noted earlier, in the Group Only treatment subjects are informed only about the total allocation to the GROUP account. In the Individual Anonymous treatment, after each period subjects learned the entire distribution of individual contributions. However, these contributions were anonymous in the sense that no contribution could be tied to any particular individual. The main result from this comparison is that (contrary to our hypotheses) the additional information about individual contributions impedes group coordination and provision of the public good. Table 1 provides some summary statistics which show this general result.
From this table we can see that average contributions and proportion of successful provisions were lower under Individual Anonymous information than under Group Only information.
A. Group Contributions
One important outcome which differed between the treatments was that of grouplevel contributions. To test for statistical differences in group contributions between the two treatments we ran an OLS random effects regression as below. Many of the regressions reported will involve the same set of independent variables. Contribution it =: 0 +: 1 Ind Anon+: 2 Period t +: 3 Period t * Ind Anon+7 i{1 : i Group i += i .
The independent variables are a dummy representing the Individual Anonymous treatment, the period number and the period number times the treatment dummy (to capture trends in contributions over time in each treatment), a dummy for each group except one per treatment (to capture fixed group effects), and an error term. In a random effects regression, a separate error term designed to capture group-specific variance is estimated for each group. See Greene (1990) for a complete description of random effects regressions. The dependent variable of interest in this subsection is group i 's contribution in period t. The results from the regression are presented in Table 2 . Results from the group dummies are suppressed for ease of presentation.
As Table 2 shows, group contributions were significantly lower under Individual Anonymous information than they were under Group Only information.
19 This result flatly contradicts our hypothesis HB 3 , that increased (anonymous) information would lead to higher contributions. This analysis also demonstrates a small but significant increase in contributions over time under Group Only information, and a marginally significant increase over time under Individual Anonymous information, neither of which were hypothesized.
B. On the Distance from Equilibrium Play
Another measure of interest is the distance between group contributions and the efficient equilibrium outcome of 125 tokens. This can be thought of as a measure of efficiency; deviations below 125 represent inefficient allocations because the public good is not provided while deviations above 125 represent inefficient allocations because the extra resources are wasted.
20 The regression to test differences between treatments in this measure uses the absolute difference between a group's contribution in any period from 125 as a dependent variable and the same independent measures as above (see Table 3 ).
The regression shows that groups in the Individual Anonymous treatment make contributions significantly farther away from the efficient equilibrium contribution level of 125 than groups in the Group Only condition.
21 This result is not consistent
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19 As one anonymous referee points out, the coefficients above may be influenced by the particular groups which were chosen to be excluded from the group dummy variables. A linear hypothesis test using the coefficients from the regression above and comparing the difference between the means of each treatment yields a similar result as the regression, with an estimate of &4.093 and a t-statistic of &5.091 ( p<0.0000). A simple comparison of the two means again yields a similar estimate of &5.904 and a t-statistic of &4.317 ( p<0.0001). 20 Although, as one anonymous referee pointed out, these deviations are differentially inefficient.
Deviations over 125 only cost 1/ per token to the group; deviations below cost significantly more, since the public good is not provided. 21 A linear hypothesis test using the coefficients from the regression above and comparing the difference between the means of each treatment yields a similar result as the regression, with an estimate of 3.882 and a t-statistic of 6.440 ( p<0.0000). A simple comparison of the two means again yields a similar estimate of 4.208 and a t-statistic of 3.810 ( p<0.0002). with hypothesis HB 1 , which suggested that more information would aid groups in coordinating and lead to play closer to the equilibrium. In both treatments, however, this distance decreases with experience. Consistent with hypothesis HA 2 , group contributions in both treatments converge toward the efficient equilibrium amount over time.
In addition, it is straightforward to see that contributions in the Group Only conditions converge to the equilibrium outcome of 125 faster than do contributions under Individual Anonymous information (t=&2.06, p=0.0404). This refutes hypothesis HB 2 .
C. On the Equality of the Outcomes
A final measure of interest between the two treatments is the equality of the distribution of individual contributions. Our hypothesis HB 4 suggests that when individual contributions are reported to the subjects, subjects will focus on the equity of the contributions and will themselves contribute more equally. Thus the variance of individual contributions within a group will be smaller. In fact, this is not what was observed. In the Individual Anonymous treatment the variance of individual contributions within each group was significantly higher than the variance of individual contributions under Group Only information. Table 4 reports the results of a random effects regression where the dependent variable is the standard deviation of individual contributions within each group in each period.
As can be seen in Table 4 , the standard deviation of individual contributions within each group was significantly larger for groups in the Individual Anonymous 
D. Summary of Group Only versus Individual Anonymous
Our hypotheses originally suggested that anonymous information about individual contributions would aid coordination and cooperation, leading to higher contributions, closer-to-equilibrium outcomes and lower variance of individual contributions within groups. However, the data from this comparison suggest that, in contrast, the additional anonymous information presented to the subjects hindered public goods provision in this game. Group contributions were significantly lower and farther from the efficient equilibrium level under Individual Anonymous information than under Group Only information. In addition, the variance of individual contributions within each group was significantly higher under Individual Anonymous than under Group Only information.
VI. RESULTS: THE EFFECT OF IDENTIFIABILITY
To isolate the effect of identifiability we compare the two treatments in which subjects are given information about individual contributions after each round of play. In the Individual Anonymous treatment contributions are revealed anonymously so that subjects' contributions could not be linked to them. In the Individual Identifiable treatment, contributions were revealed by subject number. Thus an individual's contributions could be``tracked'' over time. Table 5 provides some summary statistics from these treatments.
The main result from this comparison is that making individual contributions identifiable significantly increases group contributions and thus the proportion of successful provisions. 
A. Group Contributions
The first outcome which differed between the treatments was that of group contributions. The same regression as before is run, with the treatment dummy representing the Individual Identifiable treatment. Table 6 reports the results.
Group contributions were significantly higher when individual contributions were identified than when they were not.
23 This result is consistent with hypothesis HC 3 . The same increase in contributions over time is observed in the Individual Anonymous treatment as before, while no significant effect is observed in the Individual Identifiable treatment.
B. On the Distance from Equilibrium Play
A second measure of interest is the distance group contributions were from the efficient equilibrium outcome of 125 tokens. Table 7 reports the results from this regression.
Groups in the Individual Identifiable treatment make contributions significantly closer to the efficient equilibrium contribution level of 125 than groups in the Individual Anonymous treatment, consistent with our hypothesis HC 1 that more information is better.
24 In both treatments, this distance decreases significantly with experience, thus group contributions in both treatments converge toward the efficient equilibrium amount over time, consistent with HA 2 .
In addition, convergence toward the efficient Nash equilibrium outcome of 125 is significantly faster under Individual Identifiable information than under Individual Anonymous information (t=4.497, p=0.0000), consistent with hypothesis HC 2 .
C. On the Equality of the Outcomes
The final measure of interest between these two treatments is the equality of the distribution of individual contributions. In the Individual Anonymous treatment the variance of individual contributions within each group was significantly higher 186 CROSON AND MARKS 23 A linear hypothesis test using the coefficients from the regression above and comparing the difference between the two means of each treatment yields a similar result as the regression, with an estimate of 4.345 and a t-statistic of 5.345 ( p<0.0000). A simple comparison of the two means again yields a similar estimate of 5.864 and a t-statistic of 4.273 ( p<0.0001).
24 A linear hypothesis test using the coefficients from the regression above and comparing the difference between the two means of each treatment yields a similar result as the regression, with an estimate of &4.854 and a t-statistic of &7.863 ( p<0.0000). A simple comparison of the two means again yields a similar estimate of &4.968 and a t-statistic of &4.360 ( p<0.0001). than the variance of individual contributions when contributions were identified (see Table 8 ).
The standard deviation of individual contributions within each group was significantly smaller for groups in the Individual Identifiable treatment than those in the Individual Anonymous treatment, consistent with our hypothesis HC 4 .
25 In both
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25 A linear hypothesis test using the coefficients from the regression above and comparing the difference between the two means of each treatment yields a similar result as the regression, with an estimate of &2.535 and a t-statistic of &11.554 ( p<0.0000). A simple comparison of the two means again yields a similar estimate of &1.790 and a t-statistic of &3.861 ( p<0.0001).
treatments, this variance between individual contributions decreased somewhat over time.
D. Summary of Individual Anonymous vs Individual Identifiable
Our hypotheses originally suggested that making individual contributions identifiable would lead to higher contributions, less deviation from the equilibrium contribution level, and individual contributions which were closer together. The data from this experiment support all of these hypotheses. Group contributions were significantly higher and closer to the efficient equilibrium level in the Individual Identifiable treatment than in the Individual Anonymous treatment, and the variance of individual contributions within each group was significantly lower.
The differences between these two treatments can be interpreted as the effect of identifiability. In both, contributions are revealed, but in the Individual Identifiable treatment, subjects are able to link contributions to each individual. Perhaps the addition of identifiability imposes an additional cost for shirking against the group. There are no significant differences between group contributions, distance from equilibria or variance of contributions within groups between the Group Only treatment and the Individual Identifiable treatment ( p=0.3128, p=0.6582, p=0.0678 from three regressions similar to those described above). Whatever is lost by providing individual information is (almost) exactly recovered by making that information identifiable.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Given the existence of multiple efficient Nash equilibria in the PPM, public good provision is essentially a coordination game where the socially optimal outcome is to provide without wasting public resources through over-contribution. We conjectured that a richer informational environment which provided information about individual contribution behavior would aid groups in coordinating; this turned out to be only somewhat true.
We investigated three treatments which varied in the amount of information available to the participants about the individual behavior of their counterparts. In the first treatment, Group Only, subjects were informed of the aggregate group contribution to the public good. In a second treatment, Individual Anonymous, subjects were provided with the distribution of individual contributions in a random order. Contributions were thus anonymous, but the degree of similarity of contributions could be determined. Contrary to our conjecture, this anonymous contribution information actually impeded coordination. The overall success of the mechanism decreased as public good provision fell from 550 to 39 0. Results of random effects regressions show that the aggregate contribution level decreased, and the distance from the equilibrium contribution level and variance of individual contributions increased.
We speculate that under Individual Anonymous information, inequities which exist between individual contributions may be more salient. When it becomes obvious that other contributors are giving less, subjects may reduce their own contribution, leading to lower contribution levels and success rates.
A third treatment, Individual Identifiable, investigated the impact of making individual contributions identifiable rather than reporting them anonymously. What was lost by revealing contributions anonymously was almost fully regained when individual contributions became identifiable. Success rates increased to almost 53 0 in this last treatment, and contributions were significantly higher, while distance from equilibrium outcomes and variance of individual contributions significantly lower than in the Individual Anonymous treatment.
We speculate that when contributions are identifiable, the tendency to reduce one's own contribution in response to information about the spread of contributions may be balanced by considerations of reputation within the group. Interestingly, providing identifiable information is not significantly different than providing only group information. This is consistent with our observation that both types of information structures are observed in real fundraising campaigns.
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This study provides several important results. As also shown in previous studies, the efficacy of the PPM is sensitive to the specific institutional features included in the design. Results of this experiment clearly show that the dissemination of information (or not) can be an important aspect of the PPM design. In creating institutions for the voluntary provision of public goods, policy-makers will want to consider impacts of the announcement of individual contributions.
